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LETTER 



HON. THOM 




G 



HIS EXCELLE1NT.Y BENJ. STANTON, 



LIEUT. GOVERXOR OF OIUO. 



In Answer to his Charges Against onr Generals who Ponght the Battle 
of Shiloh, on the 6th of April, 1862. 



COLUMBUS: 
RICHARD NEVINS, PRINTER- 

1862. 



^^^^^^^w^^^^^^0^^mmm 



Lancaster, Ohio, Oct. Ath, 1862. 
Sir, 

I read your report to Governor Tod, of the 28tli of 
April last, with surprise and pain. You were dispatched on 
a mission of charitable duty — to administer to the sufferings 
of our sick and wounded soldiers on the field of Shiloh. The 
Governor had no power, and you had no mission to deal with 
the Generals who commanded in that field. You had no 
means of acquiring correct information, and your correspond- 
ence shows that you had not a suflBcient knowledge of the 
subject to enable you to appreciate justly the bearing of the 
few facts which you were able to report, truly. Indeed, you 
did not enter on your assumed functions in a proper spirit. 
Your report and your " Extra," which may be taken as a part 
of it, are simply an attack on the Generals who fought the 
battles, presented in a most objectionable form, and might, as 
you well suggest, subject you to the charge of " impertinence." 
It might well do this, because it was out of the line of your 
official duty — because you assume to treat a subject of which 
you have little knowledge, and because, whether true or false, 
the accusatory part of your report could produce only evil. 
If misconduct of the kind you charge existed, and came to 
your knowledge in a reliable form, you were bound, as a good 
citizen, to prefer charges against the delinquents, in the proper 
quarter, where they might be tried, convicted and punished, 
by degradation or death, according to the enormity of the 
offense ; and the high office which you hold, would have 
ensured the respectful consideration of such charges as you 
should properly prefer. 



But jour report and "Extra" simply tend to destroy public 
confidence in our Generals, not to remove tliem from the liigli 
station which you say they abuse. You, in effect, caution 
our young men not to enter the service, or if in, not to trust 
their officers ; assuring them, if they do, that their lives will 
be sacrificed by gross neglect and blundering incompetence. 
I have seen no papers from any quarter so calculated to pre- 
vent enlistments and induce insubordination and desertion as 
yours, if they are at all believed ; and, indeed, coming from 
high official source, your published charges must necessarily 
tend to the demoralization of our army. 

I was therefore surprised and pained at their publication ; 
and being fully satisfied that their accusatory parts are either 
wholly unfounded in fact, or have their origin in ignorance of 
the duties of the officers whom you condemn, I have deemed it 
important that the subject be carefully investigated. Much 
more indeed than personal reputation depends upon it. The 
officers whom you accuse of '■^ blundering'^'' and '■Hncompetence^'''' 
are still at the head of our armies ; and our young men who are 
in the service^ and those who are about to enter it, ought to be re- 
lieved from the anxiety they must feel, if they think they are 
destined to fight under careless and incompetent Generals, 
who, by neglect of ordinary precaution, will suffer them to be 
surprised and slaughtered m their tenta. 

At my earliest leisure, therefore, after possessing myself of 
Executive Document No. QQ, which contains the reports of 
most of the officers commanding in that battle, I examined 
the subject with care, essayed to correct the errors into which 
you have been led by inadvertence, and a too easy credulity, 
and now present to you and to the public, in this form, the 
result of my examination. 

The proof of the affirmative charges of negligence and mis- 
conduct rests on you, and you profess to give it in your letter 
in reply to General Sherman. Your specifications are con- 



tained in your report and extra. As tiie readers of tliis letter 
may not have yours before them, I give here, substantially, 
your specifications and proofs, and will examine them carefully. 
With your loose general charges, resting on opinion, I will 
not weary myself or the public ; but such of your criticisms as 
rest on definite and tangible fact, I will briefly consider. 

And first, for your specific charges. 

In your report to Governor Tod, you say : " The disasters of 
Sunday, April 6th, were the result of surprise, which is justly 
chargeable on the commandiiig officers.''^ And in your "Extra," 
you say that " our lines were so carelessly and negligently guarded, 
Hiat the enemy were absolutely on us, in our very tents, before tlie 
officers in command were aware of their approach^ 

In your letter to General Sherman, you say, in proof of 
negligence, that "the enemy encamped in full force, on Satur- 
day night previous to the battle, not more than a mile or a mile 
and a halffiom our camps, and slept soundly on their arms," 
" without any of the commandiug ofl&cers being aware of the 
fact." And you add, " This fact is established by the con- 
current testimony of more than fifty wounded rebels, who 
came up with me on the Magnolia the Monday after the bat- 
tle." Allow me to suggest here, that these fifty rebels were 
rogues, and they lied to you for their amusement ; and you 
ought to have known that they lied. After taking their 
" testimony," you returned to the battle-field and spent several 
days upon it. The ground on which an army oi forty thousand 
men encamped the night before the battle, could not be mis- 
taken — they must have left their marks obvious to your 
inspection, and any man or boy on the field could have 
pointed out the place ; nay, more, an actual admeasurement 
of the distance had been made by an engineer on the field, 
and you could have had it on simple inquiry. You knew the 
importance of the fact, and it is for you to explain why you 



did not get it, and give it truly. General Beauregard says, in 
his official report, that he encamped Saturday night at the 
junction of the Pittsburg and Hamburg roads, four miles from 
Pittsburg. It was a little more than three miles from our 
advanced lines by actual survey. 

So much for the unanimous testimony of your " more than 
fifty wounded rebels." Your statement of the fact, founded 
on their testimony, will be proved impossible by the general 
evidence which I will by and by present. 

You next adduce the testimony of one whom you call " a 
scar-worn veteran from Michigan^'' who was, you say, ''wound- 
ed in the battle, and came up with me in one of the hospital 
boats which I accompanied to the battle-field. He had a 
bullet through his leg, and his clothes were riddled with grajpe 
and canister. He was a man of intelligence, good sense, and 
undoubted courage. He was in General Prentiss' Division^ and 
his regiment, or a considerable portion of it, cut their way through 
the enemy's ranks after they were surrounded. He told me that 
the first notice they had of the attach, the enemy was upon them 
lohile they were in their tents, and that before they were drawn 
up in order of battle, they were surrounded by the enemy 
and their retreat cut off." 

A word here, in passing, as to the story of your scar-worn 
Michigan friend. There was but one Michigan Eegiment, the 
12th, in General Prentiss'' s Division; a part of that was on 
picket duty. They met the enemy's pickets or advanced 
guard very early (at 5) in the morning of the 6th, and were 
driven back. Colonel Moore went to their support with five 
companies, and met them retreating, bringing in their killed 
and wounded. Those that were able for duty he " compelled 
to return to their posts." Finding the enemy's force large, he 
ordered up his remaining five companies (Doc. 66, pp. Ill, 
112, 113). This part of General Prentiss's Division, in- 



eluding the 12 th Michigan, were gradually driven back to 
their tents, and, still further retreating, formed in line in rear 
of their tents, where, at 8 o'clock. Colonel Van Home formed 
on their right (p. 162). Sliortly after this, it appears from the 
report of their Colonel, F. Quinn, the whole regiment, except 
forty or fifty men, disappeared from the field. He says (p. 34) : 
" General Prentiss ordered me to go and rally some of our 
men, meaning men of the 12th Michigan Infantry, of which 
regiment there were not over 40 or 50 on the ground, and 
very few officers. Our Major had gone, of his own request, 
for this purpose early in the day, but had not returned." 

Now there was no time or place when or where your scar- 
worn friend could have been surprised, unless he fell asleep 
on picket guard. He could not have been attacked in his 
tent unless he hid there when his regiment formed line, as 
stated by its Col. Quinn, and advanced (a quarter of a mile) to 
attai k the enemy. 

^' Scar -worn ^^ ^^ wounded'^ and ^^veterarC as he was, his story 
was false beyond all peradventure. The movements of his 
regiment are traced step by step till all of them but 40 or 50 
deserted the field " early in the day" — a part of them were on 
picket duty ; they were attacked at half-past five and driven 
in ; they were reinforced by Col. Moore and returned to the 
charge, but were driven back to our lines ; they formed in 
line of battle, and advanced a quarter of a mile and attacked 
the enemy about half-past 7 o'clock ; they were repulsed — 
driven past their tents and formed on the high ground beyond, 
which is the last we hear of the regiment, except 40 or 50 
men who remained with their Col. and fought. Your friend 
could not have been surprised in his tent unless he lay there 
hid till 8 o'clock while his regiment was fighting in the line. 



6 

You say farther — 

" An Assistant Surgeon or Hospital Steward of tlie 57th, 
well known to me to be a man of unimpeachable character, 
told me, upon his death bed, that so sudden and unexpected 
was the attack, it was with the utmost difficulty that they 
were able to hurry their sick into wagons and start them for 
the landing before their camp was taken by the enemy." 

This, with a small abatement for imperfection of memory 
and rhetorical exaggeration on your part, is doubtless true. 
Gen. Sherman, if he expected to fight a battle, would not 
remove the hospital to an inconvenient distance, unless he 
expected also to suffer a defeat — which he certainly did not 
expect even after thousands of his troops had deserted him, 
and after he had been three times flanked by the enemy, and 
three times compelled to retire and form new lines of battle. 
He, therefore, did not order the removal of the hospital until 
he found it necessary in order to save it from the advancing 
enemy. 

You taunt him with the loss of his own baggage and say, 
if he was not taken by surprise, why did he not remove it? 
The answer is, simply that he ivould not. He expected and 
intended to defend it, and to repulse the enemy instead of remov- 
ing his baggage, and he would have done it if the men who 
ran had stood by him like the noble fellows '^ho fought to the 
last. Besides, it would have been no encouraging sight to his 
soldiers, to see their General's spare horses and camp equipage 
removed to the rear as \i^ preparatory to a flight. His purpose 
was to win the battle, not save his own person or property. 

As to your further proofs, you say in your letter to Gen. 
Sherman — 

" To give you an idea of the class of men with whom I con- 
versed on the su'ject, I will say to you that I visited the quar- 
ters of Gens. Buell, McClernard and McCook. That I met 



Gens. Boyle, Garfield and Crittenden ; Col. Smith of the ist 
Ohio ; Parrot Fyfe of the 20th ; Gibson, Mason, Mungen ; 
Smith of the 84th, Hawkins of the 13th Ohio, Leggitt, Con- 
nell and others, that I do not now recollect," and you add — 
" I spent days upon the battle field in constant intercourse 
with men of every grade, from the General commanding to 
the men in the ranks, and I saw but one man who said the 
attack of Sunday morning was not a surprise, and that man 
was Col. Leggitt of the 68th Ohio — every other man of the 
hundreds whose opinions Iheard expressed on the subject^ said the 
attack was a surprise^ that was the result of gross negligence of 
the commanding officers^ 

You leave it to be inferred, although you do not say so 
directly, that all the officers above named, except Col. Leggitt, 
pronounced the harsh judgment which I have just quoted from 
your letter and marked by italics. You have so carelessly 
worded this part of your paper that it conveys a falsehood to 
an ordinary reader without asserting it. I do not contradict 
you, or cast a shade of doubt on your veracity when I say, I 
do not believe that any one of the officers whom yoa have 
named expressed such opinion. Some of them having seen 
your paper supposed you intended to give them as authority 
for your charge. Two have written denying that they ever 
expressed any such opinion. Others have denied it most em- 
phatically in conversation. But they misconstrue your letter. 
The array of names which you have paraded goes simply to 
the fact that you kept good company. Your proof rests on 
the hundreds of others^ nameless men, whom you heard ex- 
press the opinion that the attack was a surprise, " the result of 
gross negligence of the commanding Generals.^^ 

That kind of testimony, you know, is not worth any thing 
legally, socially or morally ; but I will, nevertheless, proceed 
to prove, by indubitable evidence, the statement of these 



8 

^^ hundreds of others''^ false. If they had been "rogues in 
buckram" they oould not have lied more grossly. 

I will first show what kind of watch and ward these Gen- 
erals, whom you accuse of gross negligence, in fact kept — and 
the notice which they and through them, the other Generals 
and the whole army had of the approach of the enemy. 

Col. Stewart, commanding the 2nd Brigade, 6th Division, 
reports, (Executive Document No. 66, page 78.) 

" In obedience to Gen. Sherman's order I kept a company 
at and in the vicinity of the ford of Lick Creek, and another 
at and in the vicinity of the Back Eoad, (coming in on the 
hills opposite and south east of the encampment) as picket 
guards, and on his order on Saturday, sent six companies out 
on the Hamburg road, with a squadron of cavalry sent for- 
ward by Gen. McClernand to reconnoiter beyond Hamburg. 
The disposition of my pickets luas reported to, and approved hy 
Gen. Sherman^ 

Col. Moore, of 21st Missouri volunteers, reports, (p. 113.) 

" In pursuance of the orders of Brig. Gen. B. M. Prentiss, 
I, on Saturday, proceeded to a reconnoisance on the front of 
the line of Gen. Prentiss' Division and on the front of Gen. 
Sherman's Division. My command consisted of three com- 
panies from the 21st Missouri Eegiment — companies com- 
manded by Captains Cone, Heule and Pearce. A thorough 
reconnoisance over three miles failed to discover the enemy. 
Being unsuccessful, as stated, I returned to my encampment 
about eleven o'clock, P. M." 

So it appears that Oen. Sherman kept a company as a picket 
guard, night and day, near the ford of Lick Creek, and another 
company on the Back Eoad. That on Saturday he sent six 
companies with a squadron of cavalry from McClernand's Di- 



9 

vision to reconnoiter on the Hamburg road beyond Hamburg, 
all under the command of Col. Stewart, and in the evening 
received Col. Stewart's report of the disposition of the picket 
guard and approved it. That, on the evening of Saturday, 
Oen. Prentiss sent Col. Moore with three companies to recon- 
noiter on the Corinth road, who examined the road for the 
distance of three miles without discovering an enemy, and 
returned to camp at eleven o'clock at night. And Col. Allen, 
of the 16th Wisconsn, says, (p. 164), " On the evening of the 
5th. four companies of the 21st Missouri, under the command 
of Geo. K. Donnally, acting assistant Adjutant General, 1st 
Brigade, 6th Division, (Prentiss') was sent by order of Col. 
Peabody on picket duty." 

Such was the care for the night taken by these accused 
Generals. 

The posting of pickets was strictly no part of the duty of 
the Division Generals ; but General Sherman, out of abundant 
caution, supervised his in person. It is true he does not say 
so to you, but such is proved to be the fact. Indeed he passed 
over your criticism with marked contempt, which your utter 
innocence of all military knowledge, and the harsh and accu- 
satory language in which you saw fit to expose it, will to 
some extent excuse. 

I will now show that these pickets were properly stationed 
on the enemy's advance ; that they did their duty ; and that 
further precautionary measures were taken the latter part of 
the night and early on the morning of the 6th, so that sur- 
prise was impossible. 

Colonel Quinn, of the 12th Michigan, acting commander of 
the 6th Division, after the capture of General Prentiss, re- 
ports (pp. 33-34) : 

" At 3 o'clock on the morning of that day, (Sunday the 6th), 



10 

several companies were ordered out from the first Brigade of 
this Division to watch and endeavor to capture a force of the 
enemy who were prowling near our camp. Our brave boys 
marched out, and had not over three miles to go before they 
met the enemy, and immediately a sharp firing commenced, 
our little party giving ground. About daylight the dead and 
wounded began to be brought in. The firing grew closer and 
closer, till it was manifest a heavy force of the enemy was 
upon us. The Division " (12th Michigan and all) " was ordered 
into line of battle by General Prentiss, a7id iminediately ad- 
vanced in line of battle about one-quarter of a mile from our tents 
where the enemy were in short firing distance.^'' 

Does this morning reconnoissance require confirmation ? I 
will give you rebel ^^ testimony " for it — not fifty rebels, but one 
very large one. General Beauregard in his of&cial report 
says: 

" At 5 A.M. on the 6th, a reconnoitering party of the ene- 
my having become engaged with our advanced pickets, the 
commander of the forces gave orders to begin the movement 
and attack." This was of course the party mentioned by 
Colonel Quinn, who moved under General Prentiss' order at 3 
o'clock, and attacked the enemy's pickets, 3 miles distant, at 5. 

Colonel Allen, of the 16th Wisconsin, says (p. 164) : At 
about 5-^ A.M., a part of the force which he had, as shown 
above, posted on picket duty " discovered some of the enemy's 
cavalry about a mile and a half in front and to the light of 
our camp, and while advancing on them came upon a large 
force of the enemy concealed behind a fence, and were fired 
upon by them. This was the first fire of the enemy. Cap- 
tain Sane and Sergeant Williams of Company A were killed, 
and Colonel Moore, who had just arrived with reinforcements 
from the 21st Missouri, was wounded," 



11 

Colonel Peabody ordered Major Powell, with three compa- 
nies to support Colonel Allen, on which the fighting became 
general, and Lieutenant-Colonel Yan Home, of the 25th Mis- 
souri, was ordered up with his regiment. Colonel Van Home 
says (p. 162) : 

" The enemy had now reached within half a mile of the 
encampment, where they were checked and held till near 7 
o'clock, when our force fell back to the line of encampment." 

In other words, our pickets and advanced guard ivere driven 
in, fighting with the enemy's advance guard, from half past 5 
till 7 o'clock. "We cannot expect all to agree to the minute 
as to time. 

General Sherman says in his report (p. 28) : " On Sunday 
morning early, the 6th inst., the enemy drove our advanced 
guard back on the main body, when I ordered under arms my 
Division, and sent word to General McClemard, asking him 
to support my left — to General Prentiss, giving him notice 
that the enemy was on our front in force, and to General 
Hurlbut, asking him to support General Prentiss. At that 
time, 7 A.M., my Division was arranged as follows : [And he 
gives the arrangement of his Division as drawn up in order of 
battle.] He then says: "Shortly after seven A.M., with my 
entire staff, I rode along a portion of our front, and when in 
the open field before Apler's Eegiment, the enemy's pickets 
opened a brisk fire on my party, killing my orderly, Thos. D. 
Holliday, of Co. H, HI. Cavalry," (p. 29.) He adds: "About 
8 A.M., I saw the glistening of bayonets of heavy masses of 
infantry in the woods beyond a small stream, and became sat- 
isfied that the enemy designed a determined attack on [our 
whole camp. All the regiments of my Division were then in 
line of battle at their proper posts.^^ 

Now, if this be true, a surprise is out of the question, and 



12 

no one who knows General Sherman will believe that there is 
a shade of departure from the exact line of truth in this or 
any other statement of his ; but I propose to examine the 
question totally irrespective of the credit due to the man, and 
try his statement and yours by evidence entirely extrinsic. I 
now proceed further to support it by showing negatively that 
there was no surprise in any portion of the army. The official 
report of General Beauregard destroys the testimony of your 
more ihojiffty wounded rebels. The report of Colonel Stew- 
art (p. 78), of Colonel Moore (p. 113), of Colonel Allen (p. 
164), and Lieutenant- Colonel Van Home (p. 162) show that a 
surprise from the direction in which the attack came was im- 
possible. I will now refer to the testimony of officers of the 
line as cumulative evidence that no single regiment or corps 
was surprised. 

Colonel Buckland, commanding the 4th Brigade, 5th Di- 
vision, reports (p. 47) : 

" Between 6 and 7 o'clock Sunday morning, I was informed 
that our pickets were fired upon. I immediately gave orders 
for forming the Brigade oji color line^ which was promptly 
done." The 4th Brigade of the 5th Division, therefore, was 
not surprised, and the men hilled in their tents ; but the Brigade 
was duly formed on the color line in order of battle, before they 
were attacked. 

Colonel Hildebrand, who commanded the 3d Brigade, 6th 
Division, reports (page 76) : 

" Early on Sunday morning, the 6th inst,, our pickets were 
fired on." (Colonel Allen, page 164, shows this to have been 
at half past five o'clock. Beauregard sajs at five.) Colonel 
Hildebrand proceeds : "Shortly after 7 o'clock, the enemy ap- 
peared in force, presenting himself in columns of regiments at 
least four deep. He opened on our camp a heavy fire from 
infantry, which was immediately followed by shell. Having 



13 

formed my brigade in line of battle, I ordered an advance. 
The 77th. and 57tli regiments were thrown forward to occupy 
a certain position, but encountered the enemy in force within 
300 yards of our camp." 

The report of Colonel Hildebrand is not exact as to the 
order of events, or the hours and minutes in which they oc- 
curred, but it sufficiently appears that he had notice of the at- 
tack on our pickets — that he formed in line of battle, and that . 
he sent forward two of his regiments, who advanced 300 
yards in front of the main line of battle before they met the 
enemy in force. 

Colonel McDowell, commanding the 1st Brigade, 5th Divi- 
sion, reports (page 82) : 

"At the first alarm of the morning attack, Sunday, the 6th, 
the line of the 1st brigade was formed, as per previous orders, 
to hold the Purdy road and the right front. Two companies 
of the Gth Iowa were detached to defend the bridge crossing 
Owl Creek, and one of the 12 lb. howitzers of the mortar bat- 
tery placed to command the crossing on the hill at the right 
of our encampment. About 8 o'clock, the line was thrown 
forward to the brow of the hill, and the remaining guns of 
the Mortar battery brought up to command the several open- 
ings in front, and from this position several shots were fired on 
the enemy's masses not then in lineJ'' 

There was, then, no surprise of the 1st Brigade of the 5th 
Division. It had due notice of the advance, and was in line 
and battling hefore the enemy had formed. 

I have already copied from the report of Colonel Stuart, 
commandant of the 2d Brigade, 5th Division, so much as re- 
lates to the reconnoissance on the 5th. The planting of 
pickets on the evening of that day, and his report to, and 



14 

the approval by General Sherman of their position and dis- 
position. He goes on to say, (page 78) : " At 7^^ o'clock Sun- 
day morning, I received a verbal message from General Pren- 
tiss that the enemy were in his front in force. Soon after, my 
pickets sent in word that a force with artillery was advancing 
on the back road. In a very short time I discovered the 
Pelican flag advancing in the rear of General Prentiss' head- 
quarters. I dispatched my Adjutant, Loomis (of the 54th 
Ohio), to General Hurlbut, who occupied with his division 
the rear in the center, to inform him that General Prentiss' 
left was turned, and to ask him to advance his forces." 
" Within fifteen minutes General Hurlbut sent forward a bat- 
tery, which took position on the road immediately by Colonel 
Mason's (71st) head-quarters." 

Colonel J. R. Cockrill, commanding 70th Ohio, 4th Brigade, 
5th Division, says (page 65) : 

" On Sunday morning, April 6th, an alarm was made in 
front of this brigade, and I called my regiment from break- 
fast and formed it in line of battle, on color line. I then 
heard heavy firing on the left and in front of our line, and 
advanced my regiment about two hundred paces in the woods, 
and formed the line of battle pursuant to your order. I or- 
dered my regiment to open fire with the left thrown back, 
and did great execution among the enemy." 

Colonel Crafts J. Wright, 30th Missouri, was, at 8 o'clock, 
ordered to a point on the Purdy road. He was separated 
from his division, and reported to General Sherman. He 
formed as ordered, and goes on to say (page 88) : 

"Standing thus in line of battle some twenty minutes, we 
were able to rally to ours some fragments of three regiments, 



15 

and form them on tlie left of our own. About 9 o'clock 
General Sherman ordered our regiment to the left of his divi- 
sion, to engage in the conflict then going on. As soon as we 
were in line we commenced firing and advancing." 

Lieutenant-Colonel Parker, commanding the 48th Kegi- 
ment cf Ohio Volunteers, says (page 153) : 

'' On the morning of the 6th, our regiment met the enemy 
about two hundred yards in front of our color line. They came 
upon us so suddenly that for a short time our r)ien ivavered, but 
soon rallied again, when we kept him back for two hours, 
until General Sherman ordered us to fall back to the Purdy 
road." Here is the true secret of the ^^ surprisey When 
the armies met in battle the enemy dashed on more rapidly 
and more fiercely than some of our troops anticipated, and 
this was, in the loose language of some, a " sort of surprise." 
For this the enemy, not our Generals, were responsible. 

Colonel Parker goes on to say : " Our regiment retreated 
and rallied several times through the day, and was in the last 
stand made by our forces late in the evening, when the enemy 
was forced to retire." 

I have extracted from the reports of officers commanding 
brigades and regiments what is sufficient to give a connected 
history of the events on and near the battle field, on Satur- 
day, Saturday night and Sunday morning, and enough to 
satisfy every intelligent and impartial man of the utter false- 
hood of your information and consequent position. You who 
have made up your opinion on such information, and given it 
the sanction of your name, will be hard to convince ; but I 
do not despair even of you. I ask you, therefore, to take the 
Executive Document, No. QQ, examine the reports which I 
have referred to ; read also the reports of Colonel James C. 



16 

Veatch, commanding 2d Brigade, 4tli Division (p. 87) ; Major 
Foster, commanding a regiment in same brigade (p. 40) ; of 
Colonel Davis, of the 46th Illinois, 2d Brigade, 4th Division 
(p. 45) ; Colonel Bristow, commanding 3d Brigade, 4th Divi- 
sion (p. 52) ; of Colonel John McHeniy, 3d Brigade, 4th Di- 
vision (p. 53) ; Colonel Chas. Craft, 31st Indiana, 3d Brigade, 
4th Division (p. 58) ; Colonel Cyrus Hall, 2d Brigade, 4th Di- 
vision (p. 63) ; Colonel McGinnis, 11th Indiana, 1st Brigade, 
3d Division (p. 69) ; Colonel Ezra Taylor, Chief of Artillery 
(p. 83) ; Captam Saml. E. Bnrnet, commanding 1st Eegiment 
Illinois Artillery (p. 87) ; Colonel J. C. Pugh, of 41st Illinois, 
1st Brigade, 4th Division (p. 93) ; Colonel A. K. Johnson, 
28th Illinois, 4th Division (p, 94) ; Major John Warner, of 
41st Illinois (p. 99) ; Colonel Trumbull, of 3d Iowa, 4th Di- 
vision (p. 102) ; Colonel Logan, of 32d Illinois, 4th Division 
(p. 106) ; Colonel E. Bretzman, commanding Mann's Battery, 
4th Division (p. 110). I ask you to read the introductory part 
of each and all these, showing how they were notified of the 
approach of the enemy; how and where they formed the 
line of battle ; how they advanced in line to take position on 
the brow of the hill ; their account of the planting the bat- 
teries ; and the commencement of the battle between the main 
armies — read this and be convinced. It is hard to conceive 
of a mass of more impudent falsehoods than have been im- 
posed upon your easy credulity by cowardly and worthless 
men, and which you, under the sanction of your name and 
office, have given to the public. But read and be convinced ; 
and when you are so, withdraw the charges which you have 
wrongfully made against these brave and vigilant officers, in 
as public a manner as you made them, and thus repair the 
wrong which you have done to them and to the public ser- 
vice. This is due from you as a man of truth and honor. 



17 

It were easy to evade the direct issue on the facts which 
you have affirmed and which I deny, by what we call a 
departure in pleading — ignoring the original charge and set- 
ting up some other in its stead ; but this you may not do. 
Your charge is that — 

" The disasters of Sunday, April 6th, were the result of sur- 
prise, which is justly chargeable on the commanding officers." 
And you say that " Our lines were so carelessly and negligently 
guarded that the enemy were absolutely on us, in our very tents, 
before the officers in command were aware of their approach," 

And this it is that I ask you, as a man of truth and honor, 
publicly and explicitly to withdraw. And I ask this because 
it depends on fact, not on opinion or judgment ; it is true, or 
it is false — there is no middle ground. 

As to the battle, whether it was well or ill fought — whether 
the Generals or any one of them showed skill or ignorance, 
courage or cowardice — is a matter of judgment — criticism — in 
which you have a right to indulge ad libitum, always taking 
care to state the facts correctly. To this General Sherman did 
not object. His objection was, that you gave the sanction of 
your office and your name to an injurious falsehood. Wel- 
lington was once asked if he was surprised at Waterloo? 
" A^b," he replied, '^but lam now." Such, no doubt, was the 
case with the officers and men who fought on Sunday at 
Shiloh when they saw your report and extra. 

You object — and this is fair criticism — to General Sherman 
placing raw troops in front, in the very key of his position. 
The answer to this is, that he had none other — there was not 
in his whole Division a single regiment that had ever seen the 
face of an enemy. The troops which he had disciplined in 

Kentucky, and of whom he had made soldiers, were with 
2 



1? 

G-eneral Buell, under Gen. McCook, and made their mark in the 
battle of Monday. General Sherman with his raw troops was 
placed in front at the key of our position, as we have reason 
to suppose, because of his well-known valor and superior 
generalship. It was, at all events, a lucky if not a well-judged 
selection for the post of honor and danger. 

You exclaim against General Sherman for calling you to an 
account for your personal attack on him and some of his 
brother officers, and you say : " More than ten thousand men 
fell victims to the incompetence and mismanagement of some- 
body on that terrible day. Is it not the privilege of the people 
whose sons and brothers have been the victims of that 
calamity, to inquire who is responsible for it, and if possible 
avoid similar calamities in future?" 

Yes, they ought to inquire who is responsible for that terri- 
ble calamity, but they ought not, as you have done, to echo 
the cry of the actual culprits, and pronounce judgment with- 
out inquiry against those who watched the most — who 
struggled and toiled the most, and exposed their own lives 
the most, to avert the calamity ; and who by their skill and 
valor saved other tens of thousands from a like fate. And I 
write this to assist the inquiry — and I think I have shown, 
not by statement or argument, hut hy evidence^ that those who 
fled and " cowered under the river hanh^^ are responsible for the 
lives of those whom they deserted, and who fought and fell 
But you say, addressing General Sherman — 
" If you wish to know the opinion of men who are compe- 
tent judges of the question at issue between us, suppose you 
inquire of General Hallech, General Buell, General McCook, 
General Boyle, General Crittenden, General Garfield, or any 
other commanding officer in the army who was not in com- 
mand of any Division of the army at Shiloh on Sunday the 
6th of AprU." 



1» 

We need not interrogate ihem — most of them have answered 
without inquiry. 

General Halleck reports to the Secretary of War as follows : 

" Headquakters Dep't of the Mississippi, 
" Pittsburg, Tenn., April 13, 1862. 
" J3bn. E. M. Stantorij Secretary of War, Washington: 

" Sir : — It is the unanimous opinion here that Brigadier- 
General W. T. Sherman saved the fortunes of the day on the 
6th, and contributed largely to the glorious victory of the 7th. 
He was in the thickest of the fight on both days, having three 
horses killed under him, and being wounded twice. I respect- 
fully request that he be made a Major-General of Volunteers, 
to date from the 6th inst. 

" Very respectfully, 

" Your obd't servant, 
" [Signed] H. W. HALLECK, 

" Maj. -General Commanding. 
" [Official.] K H. McLean, A. A. G." 

And on the 16th of July, after full time to hear and weigh 
the complaints and charges of any Thersites, if there were any 
in the army, General Halleck, when called to the East, tele- 
graphed General Sherman, among other things as follows : 

"I am more than satisfied with everything you have done. 
You have always had my respect, but recently have won my 
highest admiration. I deeply regret to part with you." 

General McCook said to his brother Colonel Daniel Me- 
Cook, that your use of his name as charging negligence on 
General Sherman was wholly unwarranted, and he spoke to 
him in terms of very high praise of General Sherman's gal- 
lantry and conduct on Sunday the 6th. 

You who have rested your whole case on the hearsay of 



20 

men whom you do not even name, will not object to this as 
proof in the issue between us. 

General Boyle was speaking to a crowd of men at Willard's 
in Washington, when Chief Justice Ewing, of Kansas, entered 
the room and heard him say : 

"You do not know how to appreciate our military men. 
If Napoleon Bonaparte had commanded at Shiloh, he would 
have made General Sherman a Field Marshal on the field of 
battle." 

General Nelson, a few days before his death, in conversa- 
tion with Larz Anderson and two or three other gentlemen, 
said — 

" During eight hours, the fate of the army on the field of 
Shiloh depended on the life of one man. If General Sherman 
had fallen the army would have been captured or destroyed." 

General Eosseau, who was also in the battle on the 7th, and 
not on the 6th, in a public speech at an ovation given him in 
Louisville, on the 15th of June, reported in the Louisville 
Journal of the 18th, says: 

"I wish to say a word of General Sherman. You do not 
know him, though you may think you do. He stayed with 
us while Buckner was most expected, but at last, in obedience 
to commands, he left our State. He gave us our first lessons 
in the field, in the face of an enemy, and of all the men I ever 
saw, he is the most untiring, vigilant and patient. No man 
that ever lived could surprise him. His enemies say that he 
was surprised at Shiloh. I tell you no. He was not surprised 
nor whipped, for he fights by the week. Devoid of ambition, 
incapable of envy, he is brave, gallant and just. At Shiloh 
his Old Legion met him just as the battle was ended, and at 
the sight of him, placing their hats upon their bayonets, gave 



21 

him three cheers. It was a touching and fitting compliment 
to the gallant chieftain. I am thankful for this occasion to do 
justice to a brave, honest, and knightly gentleman." 

So much for the opinions, which you have challenged, of 
General Halleck and of the General officers who were not on 
the field of Shiloh on the 6th, but who fought on the 7th. 
These are all unsought. No one was written to, none spoken 
to. Their expressions were spontaneous as the shout of 
General Sherman's Old Legion on the field of battle. 

And as to yourself: General Sherman ought not to be dis- 
satisfied even with you; for though you may have intended 
to injure him, you have, in the attempt, rendered him a ser- 
vice which none, the most devoted, of his friends could have 
rendered him. Macaulay says, and there is profound philo- 
sophy in the remark, that "fierce denunciation and high 
panegyric make up what men call glory." You have con- 
tributed the one element, and his brother officers and soldiers 
and an intelligent public the other, in no stinted measure. 
So that what a soldier most covets, and seeks " even in the 
cannon's mouth," had been less perfectly won by him but for 
your efficient aid. For example, the highly laudatory notice 
of General Halleck and the commendation of his brother 
officers could not have been published by his friends but for 
your challenge of their opinions. 

As to General Grant, I know nothing of him save what I 
learn from the papers and reports ; but he has been a success- 
ful General, and, until the contrary appears, this is sufficient 
evidence of merit. You censure him because he did not go 
to Pittsburg Landing and see to planting pickets. This, 
according to my reading, is no part of the duty of the Gen- 
eral commanding a Grand Division, and it was well performed 
without him. Again, you censure him because he waa not at 



22 

Pittsburg when the battle began. He seems to have been in 
the right place. He had been expecting General Buell with 
reinforcements, Tiouriy, for many days ; and when they came, 
on the evening of the 5th and morning of the 6th, he was on 
the spot where he was most needed, to urge them forward 
and direct their movements; and when the sound of the 
battle reached him, he hastened at once to the field. General 
Taylor was at Saltillo when the battle of Buena Yista com- 
menced, and was absent several hours, but no military critic, 
as far as I ever heard, urged that as an objection to him or 
his generalship. 

I have expressed the opinion that, but for the misconduct 
of a portion of their troops, the Generals who fought the 
field on Sunday would have been able to defeat and drive 
back the enemy. Oar troops were encamped in a very strong 
position. They formed their first line of battle on the brow 
of a hill or ridge west of Lick and Owl creeks, that served as 
a natural fortification; the men, by, retiring a few steps, or 
lying down, were covered and concealed, and by rising or 
advancing, could deliver their fire with terrible effect upon 
the enemy ascending the smooth slope from the creeks below. 
The troops that stood fought most valiantly; but, by the 
desertion of some thousands of their comrades, their flank 
was exposed and turned by the enemy, and thus their first 
position was carried. They were driven back, and again 
formed, and again fought with the steadiness of veterans. 
Weakened as they were in numbers, the enemy again out- 
flanked them, again drove them from their position. And, 
to their credit be it spoken, they again retired in order, 
again formed line of battle, and held the enemy at bay till 
nightfall. 
To understand well how these brave men were weakened 



23 

and exposed by the cowardice and flight of their comrades, 
read the first page of General Buell's report (167). He says, 
speaking of his approach to the battle-field : 

"As we proceeded up the river, groups of soldiers were 
seen upon the west bank, and it soon became evident that 
they were stragglers from the army that was engaged. The 
groups increased in size and frequency until, as we ap- 
proached the Landing, they amounted to whole companies 
and almost regiments ; and at the Landing the bank swarmed 
with a confased mass of men of various regiments. The 
number could not have been less than four or five thousand, 
and late in the day it became much greatery "The throng 
of disorganized and demoralized troops increased continually 
by fresh fugitives from the battle, which steadily drew near- 
er the Landing, and with these were mingled great num- 
bers of teams, all striving to get as near as possible to the 
river. With few exceptions, all efforts to form the troops, 
and move them forward to the fight, utterly failed." 

General Nelson crossed the river at thirty minutes after 
five. He says (p. 174) : 

"I found cowering under the river -bank, when I crossed, 
from 7,000 to 10,000 men, frantic with fright, and utterly 
demoralized, who received my gallant division with cries — 
*We are ivhipped — cut to pieces J They were insensible to 
shame or sarcasm, for I tried both on them ; and, indignant 
at such poltroonery, I asked permission to open fire on the 
knaves." 

From seven to ten thousand of these men ingloriously fled, 
and left their companions in arras without their support, with 
lines broken by their desertion, to toil and hleed and die on the 
field. H they had stood and fought, I do not doubt, in view 
of the events of the day, that Sunday's fight would have 



24 

resulted in a glorious victory. General Sherman was con- 
fident that they could cut the enemy to pieces as he ascended 
from the creek, through the open space, to attack his line on 
the brow of the hill ; but his line and that of General Prentiss 
were broken by desertion, and the enemy was thus enabled 
to flank him without opposition. This led to all the terrible 
disasters of the day — to the loss of thousands upon thousands 
of our best and bravest men. 

And it is a vice of your report and extra that they place 
upon the same footing those who stood valiantly by their 
colors and fought all day, and those who fled at the first fire 
of the enemy — "cowered under the river-bank," "frantic with 
fright," and could not be rallied even when strong reinforce- 
ments passed them on the way to the field. You place all on 
the same footing, and volunteer in defense of all. You repre- 
sent the Generals as disparaging their troops, and you, in 
defense of the troops, disparage the Generals. Your papers 
present a false view of the subject. The Generals do not 
disparage, but speak in praise and with pride of their troops. 
The troops, as a body, do not ask or need defense, for they 
have not incurred disgrace, but won renown. And the 30,000 
who fought so bravely will not consent to be placed in the 
same rank with those who " cowered under the river-bank, 
frantic with fright, and insensible to shame." The// have no 
quarrel with their Generals. They need no defense, but merit 
praise. 

The evidence which I have referred to on the question of 
surprise vindicates alike General Sherman and General Pren- 
tiss. 

I am, very respectfully, yours, 

T. EWING. 

To his Excellency Benj. Stanton. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRF<;<; 



LIBRARY OF CONGRE^ 



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HoUinger 

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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



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